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Droughts, hurricanes and other environmental shocks punctuate the lives of poor and 
vulnerable populations in many parts of the world.  The direct impacts can be horrific, 
but what are the longer-term effects of such shocks on households and their livelihoods?  
Under what circumstances, and for what types of households, will shocks push 
households into poverty traps from which recovery is not possible?  In an effort to answer 
these questions, this paper analyzes the asset dynamics of Ethiopian and Honduran 
households in the wake of severe environmental shocks.  While the patterns are different 
across countries, both reveal worlds in which the poorest households struggle most with 
shocks, adopting coping strategies which are costly in terms of both short term and long 
term well-being.  There is some evidence that shocks threaten long term poverty traps 
and that they  tend to militate against any tendency of the poor to catch up with wealthier 
households.  Policy implications are discussed in terms of access to markets and the 
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vulnerable populations in many parts of the world.  The direct impacts can be horrific, 
but what are the longer-term effects of such shocks on households and their livelihoods?  
Under what circumstances, and for what types of households, will shocks push 
households into poverty traps from which recovery is not possible?  In an effort to answer 
these questions, this paper analyzes the asset dynamics of Ethiopian and Honduran 
households in the wake of severe environmental shocks.  While the patterns are different 
across countries, both reveal worlds in which the poorest households struggle most with 
shocks, adopting coping strategies which are costly in terms of both short term and long 
term well-being.  There is some evidence that shocks threaten long term poverty traps 
and that they  tend to militate against any tendency of the poor to catch up with wealthier 
households.  Policy implications are discussed in terms of access to markets and the 
design of government safety net programs. 
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Ato Mohammed, 55 and illiterate, resides in Bati woreda of South Wollo 
(Ethiopia) and heads a household of nine. He has been chronically food 
insecure for more than ten years when he lost his only oxen due to 
drought.  He sold the animal to buy food at the time and has not been able 
to acquire another. Currently, Mohammed holds one hectare of farm land 
and he has no grazing land. Since he owns no oxen, he has been leasing 
out the land for share-cropping on a 50/50 sharing arrangement. 
Mohammed and his family members are engaged in various types of daily 
labor activities for cash and food, and the household is a regular recipient 
of food aid.  
 
Mohammed asserts “oxen are the crucial productive asset that would 
liberate me from this insecurity trap”. On the other hand, however, he does 
not want to take credit from a regional credit organization to buy an ox as  
he does not want to be indebted and fears that the debt may be passed on 
to his children if he fails to repay. He fears that the ox may die due to lack 
of adequate feed or animal diseases for which there is no dependable 
animal health service in the community. He also fears that he may not be 
able to pay back since crop failure is frequent due to insects and droughts.  
 
The direct impacts of the droughts, hurricanes and other environmental shocks can be 
horrific.  But what are the longer-term effects of such shocks on households and their 
livelihoods?  Do environmental shocks leave some households in a “poverty trap,” with 
so few assets that they cannot engineer an economic recovery, as Atoh Mohammed’s 
story suggests?
1  Does the fear of such traps lead forward-looking households to adopt 
asset protection strategies which come at the very high cost of immediately reduced 
consumption?  Are patterns of vulnerability and access to market- and socially-based 
coping mechanisms such that repeated environmental shocks increase community 
inequality by grinding away at the meager assets of the relatively poor? 
                                                 
1 See Carter and Barrett (2004) for a discussion of an asset-based approach to poverty traps.   2
In an effort to answer these questions, this paper analyzes the asset dynamics of 
Ethiopian and Honduran households in the wake of severe environmental shocks.  The 
work is part of a comparative project that addresses the interrelationships between 
climatic shocks, markets, and asset recovery strategies among households in developing 
countries (see Little et al., 2002).  In Ethiopia, markets are relatively weak (especially for 
land, labor, and capital), and non-market mechanisms are important.  Factor markets are 
better developed in Honduras, but its inegalitarian agrarian structure may limit the 
effectiveness and extent of the social assets that may aid recovery in Ethiopia.
2  Data on a 
sample of 416 rural Ethiopian households track household assets over a seven-year period 
of pre-drought (1996-1998), drought (1999-2000), and recovery (2001-2003).  Data on a 
sample of 850 rural Honduran households capture the immediate impact of Hurricane 
Mitch in 1998 on assets and income, as well as these households’ economic position in 
2001, two and half years after Mitch.  While the steady grinding away of economic 
possibility created by a prolonged drought is clearly quite different from the acute and 
immediate destruction of a hurricane, analysis of these two disparate cases and countries 
offers a unique comparative perspective on the role of market-based, socially-based and 
aid-based coping and recovery strategies.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section II proposes an 
anatomy of an environmental shock, tracing the evolution of assets through time in the 
face of a shock, and presents an empirical model of asset accumulation to investigate 
households’ sensitivity to, and resilience from, shocks. Section III describes the asset and 
income losses households in northeastern Ethiopia suffered due to the droughts of 
                                                 
2 Mogues and Carter (2004) theoretically explore the idea that poor households will be less able to 
accumulate effective social capital in more polarized and inegalitarian economies.   3
1999/2000 and estimates the determinants of long-term asset recovery in the wake of the 
droughts. The factors that influence rural Honduran households’ exposure to and 
recovery from the 1998 hurricane are examined in Section IV.  Concluding remarks are 
offered in the final section. 
 
II. SHOCKS, SENSITIVITY AND RESILIENCE 
Ato Mohammed’s story used to introduce this paper illustrates both asset sensitivity to 
environmental shocks (Mohammed had to sell off productive assets to survive the shock) 
and lack of resilience in the wake of shocks (Mohammed has been unable to rebuild his 
assets and livelihood in the aftermath of the shock).   The goal of this section is to think 
through these twin factors of sensitivity and resilience.  Together with the pattern of 
exposure to shocks, sensitivity and resilience shape the longer term economic impacts of 
environmental shocks.   
(a) Economic Anatomy of an Environmental Shock 
Figure 1 presents the stylized economic anatomy of an environmental shock from a 
household’s perspective. The x-axis measures time and the y-axis measures asset stocks 
and income shocks.  The full economic effects of an environmental disaster can be traced 
through three stages: the period of the shock itself; the coping period in which households 
deal with the immediate losses created by the shock; and, the recovery period in which 
households try to rebuild assets lost to the disaster and depleted through coping strategies.  
While the boundaries between these stages are fuzzy, distinguishing between them is a 
useful step in thinking through the full impacts of shocks.   4
The time interval over which an adverse environmental event occurs could be 
very brief (as with a hurricane), or it could be an extended period (as in the case of a 
prolonged drought). Households can also be buffeted by a sequence of such events.  For 































Figure 1. Anatomy of an environmental shock 
 
An environmental shock has two direct impacts. First, it may destroy assets 
(washing away land, killing livestock) by an amount Θ.  In Figure 1, this first impact is 
shown by the sudden interruption of the household’s asset trajectory as its assets decline   5
from point Ab to point As.
3  The second direct impact is that it may reduce disposable 
household income below its normal level (crops fail or households suddenly must devote 
income to medical expenses). This deviation from normal disposable income levels is 
shown in the figure by the negative disposable income shock, ε.  
Households’ reactions to the direct income and asset losses during the coping 
phase are structured by the markets and other institutions to which they have access.
4  
Households with financial market access might borrow against future earnings to sustain 
their consumption standard without further asset depletion. Informal finance and 
insurance arrangements can play the same role, as can receipt of disaster assistance.  
Another coping strategy is to redirect or increase work time (reduce leisure). The 
effectiveness of this strategy will depend on access to and depth of labor markets.   
Households without access to these markets may sustain their consumption by 
further drawing down on their assets.  While this strategy will help to smooth household 
consumption over time, it implies that assets will exhibit excess sensitivity to shocks 
(declining by more than the direct asset shock, Θ).  This additional decline in household 
assets is shown in Figure 1 by the drop in assets from As to Ac. Note that two factors will 
shape the severity of this secondary asset decline. The first is the household’s ability to 
employ the alternative coping strategies listed above. The second is changes in the prices 
of assets relative to the price of food and other necessities. Unfavorable asset price 
swings (as would be expected to happen if all households in an area respond to a drought 
by selling cattle) will serve to further decapitalize households in the wake of a shock. 
                                                 
3 The subscript “b” will be used to denote levels before a shock, the subscript “s” levels immediately 
following a shock, “c” levels after the coping period (discussed more below), and “r”  after the recovery 
period. 
4 While the discussion which follows lists coping strategies in a rough order of decreasing desirability for 
discursive purposes, any household’s true preferences will depend on a number of factors.   6
Finally, households may cope by reducing consumption.  While this strategy may 
be a last resort for households that lack other assets or options, it may also be pursued by 
households reluctant to increase their future vulnerability by further depleting their stock 
of assets.  Drèze and Sen (1989) comment on the empirical significance of such “asset 
smoothing” that necessarily destabilizes consumption, while Zimmerman and Carter 
(2003) provide a theoretical foundation for such behavior.  As Hoddinott (2004) stresses, 
the costs of such a coping strategy is not only immediate hunger, but that it may also 
permanently reduce the growth and future capacity of younger children. 
The third and final stage is termed the recovery phase in Figure 1. The market and 
social mechanisms that broker access to employment and financial services will also 
shape a household’s resilience and its post-shock asset accumulation trajectory. A 
household with good access to capital (via markets, or via informal social arrangements) 
can borrow against future earnings to immediately rebuild asset stocks. A key question is 
whether the household is able to rebuild its asset base (shown in Figure 1 as the 
movement from Ac to r A′), or whether it gets trapped at a low asset level (shown by the Ac 
to Ar trajectory).   
The story of Ato Mohammed not only suggests sensitivity to shocks, but also the 
existence of a poverty trap, understood as a minimum asset threshold below which it is 
not possible to engineer successful asset accumulation.  The dashed horizontal line in 
Figure 1, drawn at a poverty trap threshold of A, illustrates the idea of such a threshold.  
As illustrated in that figure, a household falling below that threshold—either from a 
direct asset shock, or from coping strategies that further reduced its asset holdings—
would be unable to accumulate assets and would be observed over time to follow a path   7
from point Ac to Ar.
5  As discussed earlier, we might expect to see poor households 
pursue asset smoothing strategies when facing the risk of falling into such traps.  
Alternatively, if no such trap exists, we would expect that households at the bottom of the 
asset distribution would be able to accumulate assets and move ahead over time, 
irrespective of their level of asset depletion.  Similarly, we would not expect to see signs 
of asset smoothing by low wealth households.
6 
In summary, the longer term effect of an environmental shock on household 
productive assets will depend on both sensitivity to, and resilience from, shocks.  
Sensitivity and resilience in turn are likely to depend on a household’s own wealth prior 
to and in the wake of the shock, and on its access to employment and capital, as mediated 
by either market or social mechanisms. 
(b) Empirical Strategy 
This section puts forward an econometric approach for exploring the longer run economic 
impacts of environmental shocks in Ethiopia and Honduras.  The data available for both 
countries includes measures of pre-shock and post-recovery assets stocks (Ab and Ar, 
respectively), as well as indicators of the magnitude of the shocks received.  Information 
is not consistently available on intermediate asset stocks (Ac), and hence it is not possible 
to directly explore household coping strategies.  Instead, we adopt a reduced form 
                                                 
5 The notion that some households might remain mired in a trap of persistent poverty is surprising from the 
perspective of some dynamic economic theory that suggests that less well-off households would be 
expected to have every incentive to try to save, accumulate and catch up economically with their better off 
fellow citizens.  Barrett and Carter (2004) discuss the forces that could offset convergence, identifying lack 
of access to market or socially mediated access as the key force.   
6 Fafchamps et al. (1998) find seemingly puzzling regression evidence that at least some households in 
their West African sample do not manage their livestock so as to smooth consumption over time in the face 
of shocks.  One explanation of their finding is that a subset of their households are at a threshold where 
asset smoothing becomes a rational response to shocks.    8
approach, examining the overall change in assets from the pre-shock period to the post-
recovery period. 
  In order to test for the sensitivity and resilience effects discussed above, we will 
build on the following model of household asset growth from the pre-shock to the 
recovery period:  
)] , , , | , , ( 1 [ i i si bi i i i bi ri L K A A x r A A ε Θ + =  (1) 
Where Ari is recovery period assets of household i, Abi is the household’s pre-shock asset 
stock, and the function r(·) specifies the household growth rate as a function the asset (Θi) 
and income shocks (εi) experienced by household i, as well as of other household 
characteristics xi. such as age that might shape desired asset levels.   
  Conditioning the impact of these factors on asset growth are wealth, and labor 
market and capital access variables.  To explore the idea that post-shock growth 
(resilience) differs by wealth, the growth rate is specified to depend on the post-shock 
wealth of the household,  si A .  The existence of a poverty trap would be signaled by a 
negligible post-shock growth for the poorest households, while a convergent process 
would be signaled by higher rates of asset growth for poorer households. 
  To explore differential sensitivity of assets to shocks, the impact of the shock 
variables are conditioned by the pre-shock wealth level of the household, denoted  bi A .  A 
highly sensitive household would be one where shocks have large and lingering effects 
on household productive assets.  Controlling for post-shock resilience, high sensitivity of 
assets to shocks for a particular wealth level would signal reliance on asset sales to 
smooth consumption, and most likely a lack of access to market- or socially-mediated 
access to capital or insurance.  Evidence of the insensitivity of assets to shocks would   9
indicate either access to finance, or the existence of an asset smoothing strategy provoked 
by a poverty trap (most likely for lower wealth households).   
Finally, expression (1) indicates that the asset growth is conditioned by labor 
market access and capital access variables, Li and Ki.  Both factors are likely to shape 
both resilience and sensitivity.  Note that Ki can include what is commonly referred to as 
social capital assets. 
   
III. LIVESTOCK DECLINE AND RECOVERY 
FOLLOWING DROUGHT SEASONS IN NORTH-EASTERN ETHIOPIA 
 
In the study area of eastern Amhara Region (South Wollo and Oromiya Zones), the 
drought of the late 1990s was a prolonged event with uneven consequences, and its onset 
was gradual.  Indeed, the first signs of disaster can be traced to the poor short rains 
(January-April, called the Belg season) of 1998 where it is estimated that harvests were 
only 60 percent of normal yields in the main Belg growing areas (Government of 
Ethiopia,1997; 1998a; and 1998b).  That year the long rainy season (June-September, 
called the Meher) was near normal for all areas except in the Belg growing zones where 
there is also some dependence on the Meher season.  Because the Meher rains of 1998 
were near normal in some locations, drought and relief agencies in Ethiopia failed to see 
the looming disaster until the Belg season of 1999 emerged as a massive failure, resulting 
in 90 percent loss of crops (see Castro et al., 1999).  National and regional estimates for 
food relief in 1999 were drastically altered when it was observed that the Belg season of 
1999 was going to be an almost complete disaster (Government of Ethiopia, 1998a and 
2000).     10
The 1999 Meher season was only somewhat better but not good, yielding about 
40 percent of normal harvests in six of the eight study kebeles (an administrative unit 
comprised of four or five villages). Food aid distribution started in the region in June 
1999, but was not widespread until August 1999. To make matters worse, the Belg 
season of 2000 was very poor (75 percent reduction of normal yields).  With massive 
imports of food aid and the recovery of the long rains in 2000, the nutritional status of the 
area’s population had returned to near normal by early 2001.  Thus, the drought of the 
late 1990s was keyed by the failure or near failure of three successive short rainy seasons. 
The first of the crop failures was only 40 percent, but with such widespread poverty it 
was enough to initiate the downward spiral of extensive food insecurity and distress sales 
of assets (mainly livestock) that characterized the region for the better part of 30 months. 
The long term possibilities of asset recovery from this series of shocks are 
conditioned by several community and household characteristics. The study region (as 
indeed large parts of Ethiopia) is characterized by relatively weak labor markets and 
nearly absent credit markets. Land markets are severely restricted in that private 
ownership is prohibited, and legal constraints on land rentals were only recently relaxed. 
In part because insurance against crop loss is practically absent and market-based coping 
mechanisms are limited, food aid makes up a relatively large portion of food 
consumption, as indicated above. Social institutions such as burial societies and religious 
associations are highly prevalent in South Wollo. We will explore their importance, along 
with those market and aid-based mechanisms that enhance a household’s ability to 
weather shocks in the short term as well as recover in the long term. Data are from a 
seven round household survey conducted over three-and-half years in eight peasant   11
associations (kebeles) in South Wollo and Oromiya zones. The dataset also includes 
recall questions on livestock holdings during 1996 to 1999, which assess how households 
fared in terms of their assets prior to the onset of the drought. 
 
(a) Crop and livestock losses and their recovery 
It is obviously difficult to gauge the full extent of losses as a result of the droughts.  
Based on government reports, meteorological data, and household information, it is  
Table 1:  Time Sequence of Economic Losses from Drought (US$)
a 
a Based on 1999 exchange rate of 8.5 Ethiopian birr to US$1. 
possible to estimate losses and to show the kind of cumulative impacts of the disaster. As 
Table 1 shows, drought-induced losses in crop and livestock among sample households in 
the study area were $119,124 during 1998 to 2000, or $266 per household. This figure 
exceeds the annual average cash income for more than 75 percent of households in the 
study region.  Livestock losses account for about half of total losses.  
1999 was the year of heaviest livestock losses.
9  Based on interviews it is 
estimated that 25 percent of livestock losses in 1999 were distress sales at which the 
seller received less than 50 percent of the normal price of the animal sold (cattle prices, 
for example, dropped from an average of 625 birr to 291 birr).  Price swings of this 
                                                 
9 For livestock losses, Table 1 focuses on 1998 and 1999, and for simplicity sets losses in 2000 equal to 
zero, even though drought-induced livestock deaths and distress sales did not end in 1999. 
1998 1999 2000  TOTAL  Type of loss 
(per hh)   Belg 
  Meher Belg Meher Belg
  Meher   
Crop  
losses  $5,734 $4,319 12,903   17,877  $10,753  $9,284  $60,870 
($136) 
Livestock 
losses  0 $5,826  $26,214    $26,214  0  0  $58,254 
($130) 
Total  
Losses  $5,734  $10,145 $39,117 $44,091 $10,753 $9,284 $119,124 
($266)   12
magnitude constituted a huge capital loss for those forced to sell livestock during this 
period.  Adding this capital loss to the full value of animals lost to disease and death 
permits us to estimate the value of livestock assets lost during the 1999 drought year.  
Natural causes clearly precipitated the drought disaster of 1999, which resulted in a 
massive humanitarian effort, but the population’s vulnerability  to relatively small 
perturbations in climatic events is ‘unnatural’ and highlights the extreme poverty in the 
area.  
Figure 2 gives a first indication of how the weather shocks discussed above 
impacted poorer and wealthier households. The top panel shows the evolution of mean 
livestock by households in the four, pre-drought wealth quartiles.  Following the onset of 
the drought in 1998, the top two wealth quartiles appear to exhibit classic consumption 
smoothing behavior, as livestock assets begins to dip sharply.  In contrast, the two lowest 
quartiles appear to more stubbornly hold on to their livestock, showing on average only 
small decreases in livestock near the end of the drought period.   
The bottom panel of Figure 2 displays post-drought livestock trajectories based on wealth 
quartiles defined according to animal holdings at the end of the drought (mid-2000).  As 
can be seen, average holdings of the poorest quartile were essentially zero at that time.  
Interestingly, however, this group on average managed to add substantially to their 
livestock holdings over the span of the following three years.   
While this descriptive look at the data does not control for other factors that 
influenced these trajectories, it is suggestive of interesting patterns, with the highest 
wealth households exhibiting greater asset sensitivity to shocks, and the lower wealth 






















































































Figure 2. Evolution of Mean Livestock Holdings by Wealth Quartiles 
 
   14
holdings over the course of the drought.  Yet, despite this asset smoothing behavior 
which would seem to signal the existence of a poverty trap, post-shock growth appears to 
be relatively robust, even for those households that were completely without livestock at 
the end of the drought.   
One possible explanation for the apparent inconsistency in these findings is that 
those households that had completely stocked out by mid-2000 were precisely those 
households that enjoyed good social capital and perhaps other assets.  Confident that they 
could borrow animals to rebuild depleted herds, they had no reason to fear becoming 
mired in a poverty trap.  In contrast, those households that apparently defended their 
livestock could be isolated households who—like Ato Mohammed—would have been 
trapped by low post-shock resilience and growth had they let their stocks deplete to 
almost nothing.  Employing the asset growth model put forward before, we turn now to a 
more thorough analysis of the data using multiple regression methods that permit us to 
control for these multiple factors that influence observed outcomes. 
(b)  Estimation Results 
To estimate the determinants of the long-term rate of growth of livestock assets from Ab 
to Ar, we adopt the asset growth model (1) as follows: 
i bi i i si bi i i i bi ri A L K A A x r A A ω β ε + + Θ + = ) ( )] , , , | , , (, 1 [ 0 , (2) 
where the error term ωi is assumed to be normally, independently and identically 
distributed across observations, and an additive term,  ) ( 0 bi A β , that captures factors that 
affect households’ livestock holdings but do not operate through expanding growth of 
existing stock.  Sources of such additional livestock assets could include social transfers 
or gifts, as well as non-livestock assets which can be sold and transformed into livestock   15
assets.  Unfortunately, we lack data on these other assets, and instead specify that the 
magnitude of this additive term depends on the household’s pre-drought livestock 
holdings (taken as a proxy of overall household wealth). 
To estimate (2), we subtract pre-drought assets from both sides of (2) (so that the 
change in livestock assets over time becomes the left-hand side variable) and employ the 
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The growth rate terms in the curly brackets include basic household demographic 
information that would be expected to affect desired household livestock holdings (the 
xi).  The possibility of wealth-differentiated resilience and poverty traps is explored by 
including a quadratic specification of post-shock wealth level, Asi.  Differential sensitivity 
to the environmental shock, εi, is explored by letting the coefficient on the magnitude of 
the shock depend on the 1997, pre-shock wealth quartile of the household, 
j
bi Q (j=1, 4 
where 1 is the lowest quartile).  While the available data lack a measure of the severity of 
the shock received by each household, we approximate it with the share of households in 
the community of household i that suffered crop losses from June to December 2000.   
Finally, we let the impact of social institutions Si, food aid Fi, and labor markets Li 
on the growth rate depend on the household’s asset quartile.  Social institutions measured 
as community average membership in social organizations.
10  Food aid is measured as the  
percentage of a community participating in food for work programs.  While this 
                                                 
10 These include for example burial societies (kire), informal credit associations (iqqub), and religious 
groups (mehaber and senbete).   16
community level variable bypasses individual-level endogeneity problems created when 
more severely shocked households choose to participate in the program, it may still suffer 
from the fact that programs are placed in communities where the drought was most 
severe.  The labor market indicator is an average of off-farm earnings for all households 
within a village.  This number was then normalized to vary between zero and one by 
dividing it by the highest level of average earnings among the eight villages in the 
sample.  Note that for estimation purposes, all of these growth rate variables were 
interacted with Abi, as shown in the equation. 
Table 2 gives the results of the ordinary least squares estimation of the model.  
The first column presents the unrestricted model that allows for wealth effects for all 
potential conditioning factors of livestock asset growth. The second model restricts the 
wealth-differentiation of the role of those mediating factors where such restrictions do not 
weaken the explanatory power of the model.  We will concentrate on the results for the 
restricted model, but include the full model for completeness. 
Demographic factors have their expected effects on livestock growth, though 
surprisingly the gender of the household head appears to be irrelevant.  Post-shock 
resilience displays a strongly wealth-differentiated pattern.  The estimated coefficient 
indicates that the growth rate of livestock is increasing in herd size up to a level of 25 
tropical livestock units (TLUs).
11 Other things equal, these estimates indicate that 
households that exited the drought with few livestock were strongly disadvantaged in 
their rate of recovery period growth.   
                                                 
11 A tropical livestock unit is a measure that weights together different kinds of animals into cattle 
equivalents.   17
Table 2:  Determinants of livestock holdings after recovery from the drought period 
 
Sample: n=416  Full Model  Restricted Model 
Factors Affecting Livestock Growth Rate 
Demographic Factors    
Age of household head    0.020*      0.021** 
Squared age of head     -0.0001*     -0.0002* 
Gender of household head  0.039 0.030 
Land assets (in timad=
1/4 ha)      0.026**       0.027** 
Resilience    
As   0.06**       0.055** 
As
2  -0.001**    -0.001* 
Sensitivity to Shocks, ε    
1
b Q x  ε   -0.14 -0.08 
2
b Q x  ε       -1.12**      -1.07** 
3
b Q x  ε       -2.39**      -2.36** 
4
b Q x  ε       -2.30**      -2.20** 
Community social capital, SK  
 
1
s Q  x SK   -0.14   0.08 
 
2
s Q  x SK     0.05     0.08* 
 
3
s Q  x SK          0.14**       0.12** 
 
4
s Q  x SK          0.12**       0.09** 
Labor market access, L  
 L    --     0.20* 
 
1
s Q x  L    -0.12 -- 
 
2
s Q x  L      0.09  -- 
 
3
s Q x  L      0.28  -- 
 
4
s Q x  L      0.19  -- 
Access to food aid, F  
 F    --    -0.83** 
 
1
s Q x  F     0.63  -- 
 
2
s Q x  F    -0.44 -- 
 
3
s Q x  F        -0.95**  -- 
 
4
s Q x  F        -0.97**  -- 
Additive Term      
 
1
b Q   1.7** 1.7** 
 
2
b Q   1.6* 1.5*   18
 
3
b Q     5.5**    5.5** 
 
4






F(26,390) = 33.5** 
67.0% 
 
F(20,396) = 43.2** 
67.0% 
 
The sensitivity of assets to shocks also shows a pronounced wealth-differentiated 
pattern.  For the lowest wealth quartile, shocks have an insignificant effect on livestock, 
signaling the presence of asset smoothing behavior.  Asset sensitivity is then increasing 
with pre-shock wealth.  The magnitude of the estimated coefficients are such that a 10 
percentage point increase in the proportion of households in a community suffering crop 
losses is estimated to decrease the asset growth rate of the wealthiest group by 23 
percentage points.  For a second quartile household, the decrease would be only 12% 
points, whereas it would be almost zero for a bottom quartile household.  This greater 
asset-sensitivity of the wealthier groups does not imply that welfare of the initially better 
off group is more vulnerable to shocks. On the contrary, these results are consistent with 
the initially better endowed households pursuing a consumption-smoothing strategy, 
whereas the already asset-poor may be protecting their meager wealth in the face of 
adverse conditions, following the asset-smoothing strategy discussed above.  
The estimated model also explores the degree to which social mechanisms, food 
aid and labor markets bolster asset growth, controlling for shocks, etc.  Community 
membership in social organizations (social capital) increases the rate of growth (or limits 
the rate of loss) of livestock over the six years, but does so primarily for households in 
the higher wealth groups.  In contrast, there is only weak evidence that labor market 
access significantly affects the rate of growth of livestock.  While the average effect 
(from the restricted model) is positive and statistically significant, the full model shows   19
that this positive effect appears to be strongest for wealthier households.  Finally, 
availability of food aid in the community does not appear to protect households’ future 
assets, and in fact seems to have the opposite effect.
12  
In addition to factors affecting the growth rate of livestock, the econometric 
model also includes an additive term meant to capture other sources of livestock 
replenishment (including own non-livestock wealth and social transfers).  As can be seen 
in Table 2, these additive terms are quite significant and amount to 1.7 TLUs for the 
poorest households and rise to over 6 TLUs for the initially wealthiest households.  While 
somewhat puzzling, the magnitude of these coefficients suggest a major force that 
potentially offsets the low estimated resilience of less well-off households. 
In summary, the econometric results in Table 2 provide some evidence of poverty 
traps, including the relatively low resilience of poorer households, the apparent patterns 
of asset, not consumption smoothing, by the poorest; and, social capital that is less 
effective for the poor.  At the same time, other factors point to possibly net positive 
livestock recovery for the poorest households, especially the additive constant term.  In 
order to assemble these countervailing forces into a single indicator of asset recovery, 
Table 3 uses the table 2 estimated coefficients to create predicted recovery period assets 
for poor and rich households under several scenarios.  Holding other explanatory 
                                                 
12 This result is somewhat surprising, especially since the direction of the impact cannot arise from 
endogeneity with food aid being often provided to those households with fewer assets (Quisumbing, 2003) 
since the measure used here is a community aggregate rather than individual participation in food-for-work. 
A study focusing on the impact on food aid on welfare in three regions in Ethiopia including South Wollo 
(Mathys, 1999) points in a similar direction (though less pointedly), finding that while in the short term 
asset sales are somewhat reduced with food aid, months later households tend to resort back to elevated 
sales. Also, other work on South Wollo points to the limitations of food aid in enabling recovery from 
disasters in the long run (Little et al., 2003).   20
variables at their mean, Table 3 isolates the impact of shocks and social capital on the 
asset recovery of initially poor and initially better-off households.
13   
The Table 3 results show that the rate of recovery of livestock assets is slower 
where shocks are higher, and better in an environment of better access to community 
social capital. This table also reveals the net effect in terms of long-term growth rates of 
the two forces of sensitivity and resilience: We saw above that the better endowed 
decumulate assets faster in the course of experiencing a series of droughts, but that this 
group is also relatively better equipped to rebuild assets in the wake of these shocks.  
Table 3:  Sensitivity to and Resilience from Shocks in Ethiopia 
 
These two forces combine to point to an overall faster growth of the initially poor 
as compared to the highest-wealth group: the former expands assets on average from 0.2 
TLUs eightfold to about 2.1 TLUs, whereas the highest quartile increases its initial asset 
base of 11 TLUs to reach 28 TLUs under a scenario in which they do not face collective 
                                                 
13 Shocks and social capital are measured in the same way as in the regression estimation of Table 2. For 
the latter, low and high levels use the 10
th and 90
th percentiles, respectively. High shocks are represented 
also by the 90
th percentile in the data. 
  Lowest Wealth Quartile  Highest Wealth Quartile 
         Access to social institutions  Access to social institutions 
 Low  High  Low  High 























2.09 2.12  2.07 2.10  26.59 28.08 2.71  4.19   21
shocks, and in fact lose livestock over the six-year time period where shocks are high.   In 
all cases, the predicted livestock holdings for low quartile households is driven  by the 
additive constant term, which by itself accounts for 1.7 TLUs. 
IV. GAUGING THE LONGER TERM IMPACTS OF  
HURRICANE MITCH ON RURAL HOUSEHOLDS 
 
Hurricane Mitch carved a path of destruction across Honduras in 1998.  Unlike the 
Ethiopian drought described in the previous section, the impact of the hurricane was 
almost instantaneous.  Drawing on data collected shortly after the hurricane, Morris et al. 
(2001) report that poor rural households lost 30% to 40% of their crop income and 
measured poverty immediately increased 5.5 percentage points, rising from 69.2% of 
households to 74.6%.  They also report that lower wealth households lost 15% to 20% of 
their productive assets (land, livestock and plantations), compromising their capacity to 
generate earnings and livelihood.  Unclear, however, from these early studies is whether 
households were able to recover from losses of this magnitude and rebuild their assets 
and livelihoods.  While labor and other markets are deeper and better developed in 
Honduras than in Ethiopia, it is less obvious that local social relationships would function 
as effectively to mitigate the longer term effects of an environmental disaster. 
The data available for this study provide a window into these longer term 
questions.  Some 30 months after Mitch, a sample of 850 rural Honduran households 
(clustered in 30 municipalities spread across 6 provinces) was surveyed as part of a study 
on the impact of land market liberalization and asset accumulation.
14  Included in the 
                                                 
14 This sample is comprised of two distinct sub-samples: panel and cross section. The panel households 
(500) originate from a study conducted in 1994 (Lopez and Valdes, 2000) in which 450 farm households 
were interviewed to analyze the impacts of the initial land titling programs. The 2001 survey attempted to 
follow both these baseline households and the land they cultivated. Of the original baseline households, 362 
were resurveyed. In addition, 138 ”new” panel households were added. In 2000, these households were   22
questionnaire were a number of retrospective questions that probed the direct impacts of 
Mitch on household assets and income.  The study also collected data on household 
assets in 2000/2001, giving a window into the longer term patterns of asset cycles and 
poverty traps. 
(a) The Impact of Hurricane Mitch on Asset Stocks and Growth 
Table 4 presents descriptive statistical indicators of the impact of Hurricane Mitch.  
Information is provided both for the overall sample and for households broken up by 
asset quartiles.  Quartiles were defined based on households’ pre-Mitch holdings of 
productive assets (Ab), where productive assets are defined as the value of land, 
plantations, machinery and livestock.  All assets were valued using 2000 price 
information and were converted to $US using the market exchange rate.  As can be seen, 
wealth varies substantially averaging $650 for the poorest quartile and just over $75,000 
for the wealthiest quartile. Annual household income in 2000/01was six times higher for 
wealthier households than it was for poorer households ($996 versus $5,967).  These low 
figures are consistent with the high poverty rates typical of rural Honduras.  The variation 
in them is also a small reflection of the sharp levels of inequality found across much of 
rural Honduras.  
As can be seen, 44% of households suffered a loss of productive assets from 
Hurricane Mitch.  The percentage of households increases with household wealth (rising 
from 22% to 68% from the first to the fourth wealth quartile).  This finding contradicts 
the notion that poorer households are more vulnerable to shocks, though it may be an 
                                                                                                                                                 
cultivating land that had been worked by the original panel households in 1994. The remaining 350 cross-
sectional households were added in regions that were not covered in the 1994 study.  Households that were 
not operating their own farm in 1998 were eliminated from the sample for purposes of this study, reducing 
the total number of households to 821.   23
artifact of the fact that poorer households had relatively little to lose.  Indeed, as can be 
seen, among those households suffering asset losses, poorer households lost a greater 
Table 4: Losses due to Hurricane Mitch  (Mean values unless otherwise noted) 




holds  I II III IV
Pre-Mitch Productive Assets 
(US$)  23,769 653 3,998 13,718 76,821
Annual Household Income 
2000/01 (US$)  2,440 996 1,127 1,716 5,927
Loss of Productive Assets         
% Households with Losses  44.3 21.8 31.7 55.6  68.3
% of Pre-Mitch Assets Lost
a   12.0 31.1 13.9 12.2  7.5
Structure of Asset Loss* (% of total assets lost) 
    Land  29.6 22.6 16.5 25.1  31.4
    Plantations Loss  60.5 62.2 75.4 65.3  58.6
    Livestock   8.6 13.8 8.1 9.6  8.3
    Machine   1.3 1.5 0.0 0.1  1.7
Households that Lost Productive Assets        
Income Shock (US$)  428 144 164 328  722
Housing Loss (US$)  442 58 310 481  596
Aid received (US$)  232 154 330 98  320
Median Asset Growth (%) 
(pre-Mitch to 2001)  -2.6 -5.0 -4.9 -2.1 -2.1
Households without Loss of Productive Assets 
Income Shock (US$)  93 101 70 95  121
Housing Loss (US$)  119 187 96 53  89
Aid received (US$)  141 88 134 161  261
Median Asset Growth (%) 
(pre-Mitch to 2001)  5.4 8.8 5.4 4.6 3.0
 
a Figures calculated only for those households that suffered asset losses. 
percentage of their productive wealth (31%) than did wealthier households (8%).  Across 
all wealth quartiles, losses were primarily comprised of lost plantations and land.  
The second two panels of the table present additional descriptive data on households 
based on whether or not they experienced a loss of productive assets from Mitch.  Not 
surprisingly, households that suffered asset losses also experienced greater income losses   24
(primarily crop income).  For the lowest wealth quartile, these losses averaged 10% to 
15% of annual household income.
15   Loss of housing stock was also substantial for many 
households.  Aid (typically in the form of food and building materials) averaged between 
$50 and $600 across the quartile groups, but in no case averaged more than 10% of the 
value of lost productive assets.  
Finally, Table 4 reports asset growth rates from mid-1998 (pre-Mitch) to early 
2001.
16  These figures give can be used to get a sense of the empirical gap between 
' '
r A and 
'
r A  in Figure 1—i.e., the asset gap between a household that experienced a shock 
and a household that did not.  Across all pre-Mitch wealth quartiles, households without 
assets losses show substantially higher growth than those that suffered losses.  The gap is 
13.8% for the lowest quartile where poor households with losses had showed -5% net 
growth (loss) over the post-Mitch period, while poor households without losses had 8.8% 
growth.  The gap is a smaller 5.1% for the wealthiest quartile (-2.1% versus 3% post-
Mitch growth). 
While these growth differences seem to signal that poor households are more 
sensitive to shocks (and less able to recover from them), among those households that did 
not suffer any asset losses, poor households tended to grow faster (8.8%) than did 
wealthier households (3.1%).  We turn now to more thoroughly explore these patterns of 
vulnerability and resilience. 
(b) Regression Analysis of Asset Loss and Recovery 
For estimation purposes, we write the asset growth equation (1) as: 
                                                 
15 The percentages are approximate as household income is measured only for the year 2000/01 and not for 
the year of the hurricane. 
16 Median growth rates are reported in the table.  Mean growth rates are higher in all cases, but follow the 
same qualitative pattern.  Many of the high growth rates appear to be the result of inheritances received 
post-Mitch.   25
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where ωi is a standard error term.  Taking the logarithm of both sides and rearranging 
terms yields the following expression for the growth of assets from the pre-Mitch to the 
post-Mitch recovery period: 
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where the growth rate r(·) has been replaced with the specification shown above.  Similar 
to the specification employed to analyze the Ethiopian data in the prior section, equation 
(3′) indicates that growth from the pre-shock through the recovery period depends on 
basic household demographic characteristics (the xi).  Also paralleling the Ethiopian 
specification, the resilience of post-shock growth depends on the post-shock asset level, 
measured as the post-shock asset quartile of the household (
j
si Q ,j=1,…, 4).   
  Unlike the Ethiopian data, the Honduras data contains direct household measures 
concerning the magnitude of asset shocks (Θi) and income shocks (εi).  These measures 
were normalized by the pre-shock asset holdings of the household so that they entered the 
regression as the percentage of assets destroyed by the shock.  In regression specification 
(3′), the sensitivity coefficients on the asset shock variable (but not the income shock 
variable) is permitted to differ by the pre-shock wealth quartile of the household (
j
bi Q , 
j=1,…, 4 where j=1 is the lowest quartile).
17   
                                                 
17 More general specifications of the influence of the income shock revealed no significant patterns.   26
Finally, aid received (Fi) and labor (Li) and capital market (Ki) access variables 
are permitted in (3′) to moderate the influence of asset shocks on asset growth.
18  The aid 
variable is simply the amount of external assistance received by the household 
(normalized by the household’s pre-shock stock of assets).  The labor market indicator 
for a household is defined as the average off-farm labor market earnings within its 
community (there are a total of 31 separate communities within the sample).  The 
variable was scaled to lie between zero and one by dividing it by the highest community 
average earnings level within the sample.  The capital access measure was derived from a 
set of questions designed to probe whether or not a household was on its demand curve 
for credit (and hence price rationed in that market) or whether it had excess demand for 
credit and hence was subject to some form of quantity rationing (see Boucher et al. 2005 
for details).  Unfortunately, this measure reflects a household’s status in 2001, well after 
the immediate post-shock period. 
 Table 5 presents ordinary least squares estimates of the parameters in (3′) for 
both restricted and unrestricted versions of the model.  As before, we will concentrate on 
the restricted estimates that eliminate statistically insignificant interactions.  The 
demographic variables are again sensible and statistically significant.  The resilience 
patterns are, however, quite different from the Ethiopian results.  Whereas the Ethiopian 
data showed higher growth for households that emerged from the shock with more assets, 
the Honduras estimates show more resilient growth for poorer households, although none 
of the estimated resilience coefficients are statistically different from zero.  To be clear,  
                                                 
18 In principal, these factors might also mitigate the impact of income shocks.  However, in no instance did 
these interactions prove even remotely statistically significant.  In addition, interactions between the aid 
variable and the shock variables were insignificant.   27
Table 5:  Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of Asset Recovery and Growth 
Dependent Variable, log(Ari /Abi ) 
 
Explanatory Variables  Full Model  Restricted 
Model 
Demographic Factors     
Age of Household Head  0.016** 0.016** 
Squared Age of Head  -0.0003** -0.0002** 
Received Inheritance (dummy) 0.065** 0.65** 
Department Dummies  included included 
Resilience    
Asset Quartile 1, 
1
s Q   0.16  0.16 
Asset Quartile 2, 
2
s Q   -0.09  -0.09 
Asset Quartile 3, 
3
s Q   -0.11  -0.11 
Asset Quartile 4, 
4
s Q   -0.12  -0.13 
Sensitivity to Shocks     
Asset Shock, Θ    
 
1
b Q   x Θ  -2.84** -2.85** 
 
2
b Q   x Θ  -3.23** -3.24** 
 
3
b Q   x Θ  -1.55** -1.56** 
 
4
b Q   x Θ  -0.68 -1.1* 
Income Shock, ε  0.21** 0.21** 
Housing Loss 
(Equals 1 if housing loss) 
-0.10** -0.10** 
Mediating Factors   
Labor Market Access, M      
 
1
b Q  x Θ x M  0.82** 0.82** 
 
2
b Q  x Θ x M  0.41 0.41 
 
2
b Q  x Θ x M  -0.10 -- 
 
2
b Q  x Θ x M  0.14 -- 
 M  x  ε  -0.05 0.05 
  Capital Market Access, K    
  Θ x K  -- 0.26 
 
2
b Q x Θ x K  0.18 -- 
 
2
b Q x Θ x K  1.33** 1.09* 
 
2
b Q x Θ x K  0.63 -- 
 
2
b Q x Θ x K  -0.56 -- 
Aid Received, F -0.01  -0.01 
R
2  0.31 0.31 
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this finding does not mean that growth is zero, simply that it does not vary much that 
predicted with the core demographic factors.  
Again contrasting with Ethiopia, all wealth quartiles in Honduras exhibit 
sensitivity to asset shocks.  A coefficient of -1 would indicate that (other things equal) no 
recovery has taken place.  A coefficient less than -1 indicates further deterioration of the 
asset position of the household through secondary coping strategies.  As can be seen, for 
the wealthy quartiles, the coefficients are near -1.  Apparently these households had little 
need to draw down further on their assets to smooth consumption in the wake of the 
shock.  In contrast, the lower initial wealth quartiles show sharply greater sensitivity to 
shocks for the lower quartiles as the relevant coefficients are less than -1.  Table 6, 
discussed below, draws out the full economic implications of these estimates. 
While unmediated shocks are estimated to have this devastating impact on 
productive assets, more robust local labor markets help offset these impacts, especially 
for the lowest wealth quartile households.  Access to capital markets has a similar effect 
for second quartile households, though it has little effect for other households in the 
sample.   
Income shocks (measured as income lost due to the hurricane normalized by 
household pre-Mitch assets) are counter-intuitively estimated to have a positive impact 
on growth.  While it is possible that households that suffered large income losses took 
reactive steps that ultimately enabled them to more quickly build up productive assets 
(e.g., income shortfalls may have forced households into bearing the fixed costs of 
migration to secure wage earnings), it also seems possible that high income losses 
occurred when households were involved in high value market opportunities and thus had   29
better access to market-based coping mechanisms.  In any event, efforts to further 
decompose this effect by looking at quartile-specific effects caused the variable to melt 
away into insignificance.  Similarly, interactions between income losses and measured 
market access failed to detect any significant patterns.  As an addition control for other 
losses suffered in the hurricane, a dummy variable was included in the regression, taking 
a value of one for households experiencing loss of housing.  More intuitively, when 
households did experience housing loss, recovery of productive assets was significantly 
slowed by approximately 10%. 
In summary, patterns of sensitivity and resilience in Honduras appear quite 
different from those in Ethiopia.  Unlike Ethiopia, there is no sign of asset smoothing in 
the wake of shocks.  Indeed, the asset growth of less well-off households appears to be 
extremely sensitive to shocks received.  When labor and capital market access are 
stronger, this sensitivity is reduced.  However absent that access, poorer Honduran 
households appear to struggle economically in the wake of a shock. 
In order to draw out the implications of the regression coefficients more clearly, 
we again calculate predicted asset levels for a variety of stylized low and high wealth 
households that experienced different shocks in different market environments.  Table 6 
presents the results of these calculations.  Initial asset levels are taken to be the mean for 
each quartile.   For each asset level, the table contrasts the experience of a household that 
had no asset shock with the experience of a household that suffered a 31% asset loss 
(which was the mean loss level for the lower wealth quartile households that experienced 
losses).  Other shocks were set to zero and all other household characteristics are set to 
mean levels for the sample.   30
For the no shock case, the low wealth household shows higher growth than the 
high wealth household, though this result is driven entirely by the quartile-specific 
resilience coefficients of dubious significance.  However, in the high shock scenario, the 
excess sensitivity of poor households to asset shocks completely overturns this modest 
convergent process.  Absent good market access, a low wealth household that 
experienced an immediate 31% asset loss is estimated to experience further declines and 
a net asset growth rate of -48% from its pre-Mitch position to the time of the study 30 
months later. A wealthier household that experienced an identical 31% loss is estimated 
to have recovered partially from the loss and exhibit a net growth rate of -14%.  Were we 
to further take into account that wealthier households on average only lost 7.5% of their 
assets (not 31%), then the unequalizing effect of the shock would be further magnified.  
When poor households are compared to where they counterfactually would have been 
without a shock, the impacts of the shocks stand out even more sharply. 
Table 6:  Sensitivity to and Resilience from Shocks in Honduras 
 
  Lowest Wealth Quartile  Highest Wealth Quartile 
  No Shock  31% Asset Loss  No Shock  31% Asset Loss 
    Poor Market 
Access 
Good Market 







Assets  $650  $650  $650  $76,821 $76,821 $76,821 
Post-Recovery 
Assets  $1,040  $439  $584  $91,779 $65,445 $70,875 
30 Month  
Growth Rate  60% -48%  -10%  19%  -14% -7.7% 
 
Finally, Table 6 shows that more buoyant labor and capital market access serves 
to offset the unequalizing effect of asset shocks.  Under these circumstances, lower 
wealth households would be able to offset much of the 31% asset loss (climbing back to a   31
net asset change of -10%).  Wealthier households are also estimated to benefit slightly 
from better market access, but the final recovery gap between poor and rich households is 
almost eliminated.  These results are especially interesting in the context of a related 
study by Carter and Castillo (forthcoming).  In that study, Carter and Castillo find that 
recovery from Mitch was more rapid in communities characterized by high levels of pro-
social norms of trust and altruism.  Interestingly, further analysis by Carter and Castillo 
suggests that only a subset of households seems to actually benefit from the pro-social 
environment, suggesting that there may be processes of exclusion that prevent all 
households from benefiting from socially mediated access to insurance and capital.  If 
correct, when merged with the results presented here, we seem to see a situation in which 
local social mechanisms leave poor Honduran households quite vulnerable to asset 
shocks.  In this environment, access to supporting capital and especially labor markets 
seem to be especially important. 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In the fictive world of full and complete markets, poor households could draw on loan 
and insurance contracts to cope with the often disastrous asset and income losses brought 
by severe environmental shocks.  Drawing on future earnings, households in this world 
could rebuild lost assets and sustain their level of current consumption without further 
depletion of their productive assets and future possibilities.  The story of one Ethiopian 
household told at the beginning of this paper is a case study of how far the actually 
existing world can be from that fictive world.  In the real world of Ato Mohammed, 
environmental shocks can decapitalize the poor, and trap them in impoverished position   32
from which they cannot escape.  When this happens, a humanitarian problem of disaster 
relief becomes a long-term development problem.   
  In an effort to better understand the nature of environmental shocks, this paper has 
employed longitudinal data on assets to understand the longer term impacts of two 
environmental shocks, the three-year drought of the late 1990s in Ethiopia and the 1998 
Hurricane Mitch in Honduras.  Analysis of the Ethiopian data reveals a disturbing pattern 
of asset smoothing or protection among the lowest wealth households, meaning that the 
household tries to desperately hold on to its few assets even as income and consumption 
possibilities dwindle.  The analysis also reveals a pattern of weak resilience amongst the 
poorest Ethiopian households, meaning that those who exit a shock with few assets 
experience difficulties in rebuilding their assets and livelihoods.  Together these patterns 
at least hint at the generality of the experience of Ato Mohammed.   
  Analysis of the Honduran data reveals a different, but similarly provocative 
pattern.  Relatively wealthy households seem to be able to protect their assets in the wake 
of a shock, while poorer households are apparently put on a downward trajectory of 
further asset depletion as they cope with a shock.  While these households do not exhibit 
the asset protection strategies of the Ethiopian poor, they too appear to be quite distant 
from the world of full and complete markets.  While there is weak evidence that poorer 
Honduran households can begin to rebuild their assets, absent buoyant factor markets for 
labor (and to a lesser extent capital), the rebuilding process is slow, and the net effect of 
shocks appears to be profoundly unequalizing, at least over a medium term. 
  The analysis here has of course fallen short of fully resolving all the puzzles and 
complexities of even the two disasters studied here.  Further research may reveal other   33
important facets of wealth-differentiated asset recovery experiences by exploring the 
asset composition of varied wealth categories of households.  For example, do the poor in 
Ethiopia hold most of the animal assets in small stock and chickens, while the better-off 
own more cattle and plow oxen?  These types of assets differ in their “lumpiness”, their 
functions in income and wealth generation, and in the extent to which they are protected 
in the face of shocks. Future studies should address the likelihood that different asset 
portfolios of the rich and poor may constrain or facilitate post-disaster recovery paths. 
  While future research to solve remaining puzzles is always desirable, given the 
importance of shocks, it seems worth speculating on the policy and development 
implications of our findings, especially since most disasters and their impacts are treated 
as humanitarian not development problems.  An important first step would be to build 
social safety (‘insurance’) nets that keep vulnerable households from losing their assets 
and sinking further into poverty.  For the chronically poor, a safety net of guaranteed 
food needs and, in some cases, minimal cash income, can allow them to divert efforts 
from survival-type (often destructive) coping strategies, to more remunerative activities 
that might build assets and ‘pull’ them out of poverty. Given that social networks and 
institutions play an important role in keeping households from falling into poverty, 
externally supported safety nets, as well as any form of development policy in general, 
need to be cognizant of the way in which such social networks operate so as to minimize 
any potential negative impact of programs on existing social institutions. 
The estimated relevance of markets for households’ ability to resort to livelihoods 
that do not lead to asset erosion suggests programs that go further than building safety 
nets. Policies that improve non-farm employment opportunities, rural market   34
infrastructure, and availability of credit—especially in the post-disaster period—are 
important ways that governments and development agencies can help limit long-term 
asset depletion. Our findings show that market conditions do make a difference in how 
shocks differentially affect certain communities and regions.  Policies that make markets 
more accessible to the chronically poor and vulnerable will mitigate the kind of 
widespread human suffering now associated with natural disasters.     35
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